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The Taming of the News:
How Mass Media Affect U.S. Foreign Policy
by Dave Campbell
There is an old axiom among members of
the media: All local news is news and all foreign
news is foreign. While obviously overstated, this
saying neatly summarizes the long-standing perception about how the American public views
foreign news. Conventional wisdom has held
that owing to this seeming indifference, policy
makers (particularly the executive branch) were
free to formulate foreign policy without much
input from public opinion. They needed only to
keep policy within the very broad parameters
deemed acceptable by the American public
(Kelleher 1994, 235).
The question to be considered in this paper is whether the ubiquity of mass media with
heavy foreign news coverage like the Cable News
Network (CNN), has changed how u.s. foreign
policy is made. In answering the question, the
utility of a model developed by O'Heffernan
(1991) will be evaluated. O'Heffernan's model
appears useful because it takes into account two
aspects of television's possible effect on foreign
policy:
• the concept labeled "pictures driving policy"
(Siegel 1993, 13). This phenomenon allegedly
results from graphic scenes like those from
Bosnia or Somalia broadcast on television,
driving public opinion which then influences
the decisions made regarding U.s. action
abroad.
• the immediate information available through
real-time media like CNN to foreign policy
makers themselves.
In brief, O'Heffernan's model proposes
that (1) the media add new information, rapidly,
both to what the public and elite know about foreign policy issues, particularly crises; (2) the media give high profile to nongovernmental organizations and even individuals as they report on
foreign affairs; and (3) the media introduce a
broader range of goals and criteria than previously considered when making foreign policy
decisions (1991, 91). Following O'Heffernan's
lead, for the purposes of this paper mass media
will be defined as both newspapers and television.

To evaluate this model two case studies
will be compared--the 1965 U.s. invasion of the
Dominican Republic and the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti.

Exposition
Before gauging the utility of O'Heffernan's model, it is necessary to review first the
longstanding norms of academic opinion regarding the media's influence on the foreign policy process and then what seem to be recent
changes in this opinion.
The landmark work on this subject is
generally considered to be Bernard Cohen's 1963
book The Press and Foreign Policy (Taylor 1994). In
his book Cohen paints a picture of an almost
symbiotic relationship between key newspaper
journalists and chief foreign policy makers. As
Cohen saw it, prominent columnists and reporters could influence policy as "actors in the process, trying to influence the opinions of both the
public and the government official" (1963, 39).
Conversely, the media was also seen as an
"instrument of government" (28), publishing information fed to them by high-level contacts in
the State Department or White House.
The general public was viewed by journalists and policy makers as uninterested in the
workings of foreign policy. Following World War
Two foreign policy scholars like Cohen came to a
consensus, based on the writings of Gabriel Almond and Walter Lippmann, that the general
public knew little about foreign policy and policy
makers cared little about how the general public
felt regarding foreign affairs (Holsti 1992). Instead, scholars spoke of an "attentive public," a
small percentage of the electorate who pay attention to foreign news sources like the New York
Times, and offer opinions to those who formulate
American foreign policy. This attentive public in
turn influenced the opinions of the mass public,
in what is generally labeled the "two-step" model
of communication (Flanigan and Zingale 1994,
145).
With the rise of satellite-linked television
services, and the overwhelming pervasiveness of
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mass media outlets, these assumptions have begun to be re-evaluated.

With data like this in mind, many have
now called into question whether the AlmondLippmann view of a public largely unaware of
foreign news is still accurate (Holsti 1992). Due to
the ubiquity of television, the public may not
necessarily be more intrinsically interested in foreign affairs but may be more aware of it. While
her thoughts are by no means conventional wisdom among academics, Kelleher claims that:

It is clear that more and more Americans
rely on television images as their international frame; the widening availability of
CNN and other "instant reality" channels
suggests this trend will continue ....The
result may well be both oversimplification
and a higher average level of information
among attentive publics. There is clearly
also a far greater emotional impact on the
public as a whole. (Kelleher 1994,233)

Almost every general foreign policy survey shows the public is increasingly well
informed about global issues, devotes attention to evolving international events,
and has clear opinions on most major foreign and defense policy questions. (1994,
235)

What Kelleher calls the emotional impact of television news is what has received the most attention of late. From the live broadcasts of Peter
Arnett in Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War
to coverage this April of bombs falling on a
Sarajevo market, every strata of the American
public is able now to experience what goes on
across the sea like never before. Television is a
visual medium, and images can evoke powerful
responses:

In light of what appears to be a radical shift in the
salience of foreign news in America owing to the
mass media, a new model to explain the relationship between media coverage of foreign matters
and foreign policy decisions seems needed. In
reference to advances in the technology used by
the mass media, Snow and Brown have written:

More than print or radio, television news-especially as practiced with the more and
more vivid and dramatic techniques of the
1970s and 1980s--provoke[s] an intense
and often passionate reaction to foreign issues. (Beschloss 1994, 40)

In subtle ways that neither practitioners
nor theoreticians yet understand, these
advances are changing the international
affairs that are the substance of foreign
and defense policy, as well as the way
policy is made. (1994, 227)

Foreign news now receives more prominence in
both the print media and on television than ever
before, partly because twenty-four hour a day
media outlets like CNN have a lot of time to fill,
but also to a large extent because the technology
now exists to broadcast events from around the
globe as they happen. Newspapers too now have
the capability to "receive typeset copy and digitized photographs by satellite around the world,
enabling them to print same-day editions with
current news" (O'Heffernan 1991, 4). It seems that
more and more Americans are privy to foreign
policy news, available with little effort. In 1963
Cohen estimated that the average American
spent two and one third minutes reading foreign
news (251). At the time, only 29 percent of
Americans considered television a credible
source for international news (Beschloss 1994,
39). Times have changed. In 1980, 51 percent of
Americans found television news to be the most
credible source for news, while the network news
featured an average of ten minutes a night of foreign news (ibid. In 1989, 25.4 percent of the
American public reported watching CNN within
the last seven days (Stanley and Niemi 1992, 54).
This fact is particularly significant for this discussion because CNN "is deeply committed to international news coverage" (Beschloss 1994, 40).

Considering this perceived lack of understanding, let us turn to an analysis of a new theoretical
framework specifically developed in contradistinction to Cohen's conclusions, that of O'Heffernan.

Analysis
O'Heffernan's model is far too extensive
to deal with completely here. For the sake of
space, this paper will address only how the media provide input to the foreign policy process.
Areas left unexplored include how the government uses the media as an outlet to persuade the
public to support policy and how real-time television coverage (CNN especially) has changed
the once fairly closed and deliberative world of
diplomacy.
Media as a source of information
Perhaps the most apparent effect of the
mass media's foreign news coverage is the sheer
amount of information they make available. As
Cohen saw it, the media relied on government
sources exclusively for most of their foreign
news. While today's media certainly still rely on
information supplied by policy makers (apparent
2
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in the Persian Gulf War), they are also able to
shoot video, take pictures, and write stories at the
scene of a foreign story, crisis or otherwise. Only
with the technology available in the last few
years--satellite hook-ups, miniaturized television
cameras, etc.--has this been possible.
Turning to the comparison between the
Dominican Republic invasion in 1965 and the
Haiti intervention of 1994, we can see how technology has changed the manner in which the
media cover foreign stories. The comparison
between these two military invasions is particularly suited to this study for a number of reasons.
They both involve approximately the same number of U.S. troops, twenty thousand (Collins 1991,
155). Both nations share the island of Hispaniola,
and are therefore the same distance from U.S.
borders. While the circumstances surrounding
the two interventions are not identical, they both
involve an American force landing in a small
Caribbean nation to ensure the installation of a
government friendly to the U.S. In 1965 the U.S.
was worried that the Dominican Republic would
fall to Marxist revolutionaries; in 1994 the u.s.
was ostensibly worried about human rights violations by the Cedras regime. Beyond these broad
similarities, there is an important difference between these two invasions. In 1965, the technology needed to link continents with TV signals
bounced off of a satellite was only in its infancy.
Ironically, the first test of such a system occurred
five days after the u.s. troops landed in the Dominican Republic (Gould 1965, AI).
Without today's technology allowing for
real-time broadcasting, the media were forced, as
Cohen's model suggests, to rely upon the American Ambassador to the Dominican Republic for
information. In retrospect, the information provided was highly inaccurate; the crisis was terribly exaggerated.

an executive with NBC News, "This is the first
event of this kind where the news organizations
are not relying on the military for primary access.
If the invasion is in Port-au-Prince, we'll see all
there is to see" (Carter 1994, A8). There is little
doubt that President Clinton wanted to avoid the
broadcast of u.s. troops either getting shot or
shooting others, providing impetus for the Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation to negotiate with
Haiti's ruling junta and avoid a bloody invasion.
The first aspect of such media saturation
is that the public knows more about the effects of
foreign policy decisions made, and perhaps most
significantly, can see more of those effects than at
any time in the past. Recent research has shown
that, contrary to Cohen's description of the limited effect public attitudes have on foreign policy
decisions, contemporary policy makers do heed
what they perceive public opinion to be. Having
conducted extensive interviews with officials
from both the State Department and the National
Security Council, Powlick concluded in 1991 that
there is "virtually a cultural norm within the foreign policy bureaucracy, that the best policy is
one which accounts for public opinion" (625).
Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel to both
Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, has repudiated
the Almond-Lippmann consensus (upon which
Cohen based his work) that the opinions of only
a select few in the electorate are considered when
foreign policy is made.
To sustain its foreign and national security policies, an administration must not
merely satisfy the minority of print readers who care about such issues, it must
now satisfy the entire national television
audience as well. This is especially true of
policies that place U.S. forces at risk. (1984,
114)

More recently, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has admitted that engagement of U.S.
troops does depend on public pressure (Hoge
1994, 138-39).
Thus far, I have attempted to demonstrate that blanket media coverage of foreign
news has affected mass U.s. public opinion,
which is then taken into consideration by policy
makers. Another implication of the constant barrage of new information provided by the mass
media is that foreign policy makers themselves
are often directly affected by what they see. In a
questionnaire administered to top policy makers
in the Reagan administration, 83 percent said that
"they knew first or second hand of a case where

When the correspondents were finally
allowed to visit the cities and countryside,
they discovered that none of the norror
stories that they had reported were true.
Instead of the 1,000 and 1,500 bodies
which, according to President Johnson,
had made the intervention imperative,
there were fewer than a dozen. (Graber
1984,324)

Contrast this with Haiti. There the networks had
set up broadcast equipment days before the U.s.
troops landed. As one example, CNN had four
locations in the tiny country from which it could
transmit video. In the words of David Bohrman,
3
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mined if such a "change hypothesis" is accurate
(1991, 637). This question requires further research along the lines of the following discussion.
Earlier I noted that some academics have
predicted that with the amount of foreign news
available, Americans have overcome their notorious ignorance regarding overseas matters.
While Kelleher (1994, 235) is confident of such an
assertion and Snow and Brown (1994, 231) hypotheSize that this is so, the evidence to date is
hardly conclusive. In a comprehensive study of
U.S. public opinion from the 1930s to the 1980s,
Page and Shapiro (1992) concluded that there has
been no noticeable increase in public attentiveness to foreign policy matters. Wittkopf (1990)
conducted a similar analysis of public opinion
data over thirteen years and likewise has noted
no upswing in the percentage of the American
electorate attentive to foreign affairs.
Anecdotally, however, a comparison
between survey responses about Haiti in 1994
and the Dominican Republic in 1965 does lend
credence to the assertion that Americans are
more likely to have cogent opinions about foreign policy. When Gallup asked Americans in
May of 1965 (a few weeks after u.s. troops
landed in the Dominican Republic) whether they
thought the troops were likely to stay there for a
year or two, 32 percent said they had no opinion
(Gallup 1972, 1943). But in 1994, a Time / CNN poll
found only 7 percent of Americans were not sure
when asked how long they thought U.S. troops
would stay in Haiti (T i me, CNN, and
Yankelovich Partners 1994). Why would 25 percent more of the public have a fairly substantive
opinion (beyond merely supporting or opposing
the troops' presence) about Haiti than the Dominican Republic? A likely reason is the media's
far more extensive coverage of one than the
other.
While I was not able to compare television coverage thirty years apart, an analysis of
New York Times coverage does show the much
higher profile Haiti has had recently than that of
the Dominican Republic in 1965. There is a likely
link, however, between what the elite print media and television news cover. Robinson and
Sheehan hypothesize that there is a "new" two
step model of communication--"from the New
York Times to Dan Rather [and television news
outlets generally] to the public" (in O'Heffernan
1991,62). In looking at the International section of
the Times from the day u.s. troops landed and
then six days after for both invasions, a greater

TV directly impacted policy by providing information that either contradicted official information or provided a visual element so powerful it
affected policy officials who saw it" (O'Heffernan
1991, 73). Of that 83 percent, most commented
that what they saw was broadcast on the network
news or CNN.
With both policy makers and the public
being saturated with so much information,
O'Heffernan has identified a "fast-forward effect."
No longer can policy makers have a time frame
like the six days President Kennedy had during
the Cuban Missile Crisis to mull decisions over.
Instead, decisions must be made rapidly as new
information becomes available. In looking at the
Haiti intervention we have seen a textbook case
of this "high speed" policy making. Originally,
the troops sent to Haiti were under strict orders
not to become a police force. This led to the
spectacle on television of U.S. troops standing
idle while Haitian police brutally beat Haitian civilians. Predictably, after only a few days of such
pictures being beamed into America's homes, the
Clinton administration quickly changed the policy. The troops were instructed to halt such
atrocities. Referring to coverage of U.S. soldiers
being unable to stop Haitian-on-Haitian violence,
one White House aide said "four or five nights of
it on television would have undone us politically" (Jehl 1994, AI). Note that the decision to
change the policy was made after U.S. forces had
been in Haiti for only a few days. In the Dominican Republic incident, the decision to send troops
was based on what is now generally considered
to be bogus information. The media were not
able to verify what they were being told by government officials for over a week (Graber 1984,
323). Unlike Haiti, there was no media presence
to force the Johnson administration to reconsider
its policy quickly.
To this point, O'Heffernan's description
of the effect of the rapid information provided by
the media on foreign policy matters seems to be
accurate. However, while O'Heffernan has dealt
with whether foreign policy makers consider
public opinion, he has skirted the question of
whether the public is more knowledgeable now
than they have been in the past about foreign affairs. Because he has explicitly stated that this
work is designed to update that of Cohen, and
Cohen based his work on the assumption of an
uniformed public, this seems to be a glaring
omission. Pow lick, whose work is very similar to
O'Heffernan's, admits that no one has yet deter4
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pervasiveness is apparent for Haiti than the Dominican Republic. In 1965, the New York Times
ran forty stories about the Dominican Republic in
that time period, none having a full banner
headline. By way of contrast, in 1994 the Times
ran fifty-four stories about Haiti during the first
week of the troops' presence there. More significantly, four consecutive days saw Haiti take a full
banner headline across the top of the front page.
Indeed, on the twentieth of September stories
about Haiti filled five full pages in the Times. Mter only a few days, the Times began running a
regular Haiti section of one to four pages of stories, diagrams, and pictures entitled "Mission in
Haiti." The Dominican Republic invasion received no such treatment.
Even taking into account Viet Nam as a
rival story in 1965, at least one media outlet, and
one of the leading ones at that, gave far greater
prominence to the 1994 events in Haiti than those
in the Dominican Republic twenty-nine years
ago.
I mention this disparity in media treatment of the Dominican Republic case compared
to the Haiti example because of the conventional
wisdom among some scholars that while the media do not tell people what to think, they are able
to influence what people think about (Fry, Taylor, and Wood 1994, 119). As Entman has pointed
out, these two effects may not be as mutually exclusive as has been generally assumed. "[T]he
media make a significant contribution to what
people think--to their political preferences and
evaluations--precisely by affecting what they
think about" (1989,347). Public opinion appears
to grow out of an interaction between media
messages and what audiences make of them.
When the messages the media present are framed
exclusively by government sources, the public is
inclined to support the administration's decisions. No better example exists of this phenomenon (which could perhaps be labeled the "limited
information effect") than the 1975 Mayaguez incident.

In Haiti, the American public could see what was
happening there first-hand and hear commentators compare it to the recent u.s. troop engagement in Somalia (another event covered extensively by the media). In the Dominican Republic,
there was very limited television coverage, and
relatively restricted newspaper coverage. All of
this may help explain why 76 percent of Americans supported President Johnson sending troops
into the Dominican Republic (Gallup 1972, 1942),
but of a more jaded 1994 public, only 43 percent
supported an invasion of Haiti (Gallup / CNN /
U.S.A. Today 1994).
New actors
In his model, O'Heffernan goes further
than simply point out that the media provide a
lot of information rapidly in the course of a foreign policy event. He also notes that the media
provide visibility for nongovernmental actors
and players with a narrow interest in various facets of foreign policy.
Insiders perceive that the strength of these
groups comes from their ability to publicize their issues widely through the mass
media, and to use the media to develop
the resources necessary to operate multIlaterally. The media coverage gives these
issues salience and occasionally becomes a
channel for political influence.
(O'Heffernan 1991, 93)

In the case study of Haiti, such a role has been
played by Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, a
group concerned with the immigration of refugees from mostly black nations. During April and
May of 1994, Robinson conducted a twenty-seven
day hunger strike to protest what he saw as unfair treatment of Haitians fleeing the Cedras regime. Robinson's fast certainly had the media's
attention. And remembering Entman's observation, if the media are influencing what people
think about, they are affecting what they think.
Over the twenty-seven days of his hunger strike,
a search on a computer database (Lexis/Nexis)
found that CNN ran fifty-six stories featuring
Randall Robinson. During and following the
hunger strike, Robinson and other Haitian advocates became regular features on CNN talk shows
whenever the topic of Haiti was to be dealt with.
The rise of prominent individuals and
special interest groups as influencing factors in
foreign policy matters is a relatively new phenomenon. In the contemporary policy making
process "policy officials perceive that these or-

Throughout the crisis, [President Gerald]
Ford was able to frame issues in his own
way and present information in a fashion
that supported his actions. Most Americans considered the liberation of the Mayaguez crew a triumph for the President,
despite the fact that roughly twice as
many Americans were killed in the venture as those rescued. (Beschloss 1994, 46)
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ganizations are effective in placing global issues
on the foreign policy agenda and maintaining
their salience" (O'Heffernan 1991, 93). It was reported in May that President Clinton was very
aware of the opposition to his Haiti policy resulting from Randall Robinson's hospitalization
(Fenyevsi 1994, 24).
Note that the coverage of Robinson's fast
also matches the two previously discussed aspects of the media's information barrage. Both
the general public and elite policy makers saw
the same news broadcasts.
At the time of the Dominican Republic
invasion, there was no equivalent advocate
and / or special interest group pushing Dominican Republic issues onto the agenda of either the
public or decision-making elites. This is hardly
surprising. While newspapers were able to give
coverage of such actors in print, television had
not yet developed the inclination to provide the
regular video images necessary to mobilize mass
opposition to government policy. Many observers posit that not until the Viet Nam War's Tet
Offensive in 1968 was there an "end of media
trust in the government's conduct of defense and
foreign policy" (Snow and Brown 1994, 224).

about Haitian refugees. Comparatively, the Dominican Republic intervention was cast simply as
a battle to thwart the spread of communism, to
prevent another Cuba (Wiarda and Kryzanek
1982, 127). The media presented no domestic angle to compare to the connections made in the
Haitian case to Haitian refugees and wealthy expatriates.
By way of analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this broader range of goals and
criteria showcased by the media is a cause or an
effect of the trend toward "intermestic" politics.
At the time of the Dominican Republic intervention, foreign policy was viewed through Cold
War glasses by both policy makers and the media. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy
formulation has been made far more difficult
now that there is no longer a zero-sum competition for influence between the Americans and
Soviets. With this complexity, many issues, like
Haiti, are viewed as both international and domestic. Whether the media has facilitated this
mixing of once separate policy spheres, as O'Heffernan asserts, or instead only reported on what
would have happened even without their coverage is difficult to say. Further research is needed
to strengthen this element of O'Heffernan's
model.

Broader range of goals and criteria
The third element of O'Heffernan's
model is the ability the media now have to
"broaden the range of goals and criteria used for
policy by interconnecting causes and effects that
normally operate outside agency purview or perceptions" (1991, 91). In other words. the media
can take an issue like overseas military intervention, which thirty years ago would have been
perceived strictly as a foreign policy matter, and
make a connection to domestic issues. This interconnection is why Randall Robinson's concerns
about Haitian refugees reaching U.S. shores are
relevant to a discussion about U.S. military involvement in Haiti. The refugees represent the
domestic side to a foreign issue. Indeed, in laying
out this facet of his model, O'Heffernan comments that "military and diplomatic policies in
Central America may create refugees in Texas
and California" (ibid.). Substitute "Haiti" for
"Central America" and "Florida" for "Texas and
California" and we have an almost prophetic description of a key factor in the decision to intervene in Haiti.
Clearly the refugee issue has had salience. A survey of CNN transcripts from January
1, 1994 to November 1, 1994 found 274 stories

Prescription
O'Heffernan's model, developed to update Cohen's work of over thirty years ago,
seems to be a useful analytical tool. However,
more work is needed to refine it. Specifically,
future research should be directed at determining
whether or not media pervasiveness has made
the American public more aware now of foreign
issues than in the past. Meta-analyses of cumulative public opinion polls, along the lines of the
work by Wittkopf (1990), seem to be a good place
to start. Similarly, while O'Heffernan's model incorporates the interconnection between foreign
and domestic issues, the jury is still out on
whether the media coverage of such is a cause or
an effect.
Including public opinion in a discussion
of foreign policy frightens many analysts. Since
the days of the Founding, mass public opinion
has been feared as irrational, especially in the
sphere of foreign policy. However, this fear is unfounded. As Page and Shapiro (1992) have concluded, the American public has demonstrated
an historical rationality about policy issues, not
the capriciousness and volatility it is often as6
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sumed to have. This is true even in an age with
ever increasing foreign news coverage. If anything, television's fast-forward effect can simply
speed up policy makers' accounting for the
opinions of those who ultimately employ them-the general public. In the words of Lloyd Cutler:

media will create one, often to the detriment of
sound policy. Take Bosnia for example. When
CNN broadcast pictures this April of a bombed
out market in Sarajevo, policy makers felt forced
to respond by ordering NATO airstrikes. But the
pressure to respond, driven by CNN's pictures,
was only felt because the Clinton administration
had a weak policy on the Balkan War. In Somalia
we had a similar situation--TV pictures prompted
George Bush to send U.S. troops in, and TV pictures spurred Bill Clinton to pull them out.
World politics abhors a policy vacuum. In the absence of real leadership on an issue, the media,
not policy makers ultimately accountable to the
electorate, will influence what the public thinks
about, and therefore what they think.
Thus, if the current administration
wishes to staunch the threat of having CNN's
pictures drive policy, it must act now to formulate policy that can be explained to the American
public. In Korea, where I believe the United
States runs a higher risk of war than the Clinton
White House admits publicly, sound policy must
be developed and communicated to the public.
The same must happen in Bosnia. Ted Koppel,
the man pundits have called TV's Secretary of
State (Snow and Brown 1994, 229), has put it this
way:

TV news can provide a useful early
warning that a policy course that costs
American lives or jobs will be very difficult to sustain over an extended period. It
can force an administration to calculate
fully the costs and benefits of such a policy
before it casts the die. (1984, 118)

Sadly, in interviewing State Department and
NSC staffers, Powlick (1991) has found that while
most acknowledge the need for public approval
of their policies, most also resent the role it plays.
Such elitism is not only undemocratic, but misguided. While I admit that the average American
may not know many of the niceties, nuances, and
details of foreign policy matters, the average
American does seem to be skeptical of the need
to risk the deaths of U.s. soldiers when the nation's vital interests are not at stake. That hardly
seems to be irrational. In fact, had the public been
made more aware of the real situation in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, objections likely
would have been raised, U.S. troops would not
have invaded, and U.S. relations would not have
been damaged throughout the Caribbean and
Latin America (Collins 1991, 156). In 1994, if the
threat that the mass media would cover an invasion of Haiti kept President Clinton looking for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, then perhaps
the fourth estate has filled the role it was meant
to play.
This is not to say, however, that all is
well in Washington. As Lee Hamilton, Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has
commented:

To the degree ... that u.s. foreign policy
in a given region has been clearly stated
and adequate, accurate information has
been provided, the influence of television
coverage diminishe[s] proportionately.
(U.s. Congress 1994, 5)

In closing, it should be noted that the
media have long affected u.s. foreign policy. A
century ago, William Randolph Hearst's muckrakers helped foment u.s. public opinion in favor
of the Spanish American War. The difference today comes in the speed in which the media report, the visceral impact of the visual images they
broadcast, and the very pervasiveness of media
outlets. Whether it is CNN at the barbershop or
the New York Times at the bus stop, the media are
everywhere. The model outlined here offers
promise in making sense of how the new technology of the mass media has affected foreign
policy. However, the opportunity presents itself
for this and subsequent administrations to ensure
that pictures do not drive policy. The media need
not set America's foreign policy agenda. If the
administration has already set and communicated one, they need only report on it.

Television ... encourages policy makers
to react quickly, perhaps too quickly, to a
crisis .... Television, critics say, leads not
to sound policy, but to sound bites masDuerading as policy. (U.s. Congress 1994,

Hamilton is right. While it can provide opportunity for the public to see the effects of foreign
policy decisions in all their graphic detail, the
mass media (television especially) must not become the sole agenda setter in the sphere of the
international affairs of the United States. Instead,
policy makers themselves must have an agenda
on which the media can report. Otherwise the
7
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Why The Southern African Development Council
Should Participate In
The World Energy Efficiency Association
by Kevin H. Ellsworth
Modem transportation and communication have provided the international community
with an unprecedented potential for economic
growth and development through global and regional cooperation. To harness this potential for
cooperative development, international regimes
and regional organizations have mobilized to
provide forums for cooperation. Unfortunately,
organizations supplying services and those
seeking the services do not always find one another. Such is the case with the World Energy Efficiency Association and the Southern African
Development Council.
The Southern African Development
Councilor SADC (pronounced sad'ick) comprises ten southern African states working together for common economic and developmental
goals. The states coordinate developmental efforts among themselves and reach abroad for developmental assistance. On the other hand, the
World Energy Efficiency Association or WEEA
(pronounced wee'ah) dedicates itself to helping
developing nations use and produce energy efficiently by supplying those nations with a variety
of coordinating and informative services. Dozens
of developing countries have begun seeking
WEEA's assistance.
Unfortunately, southern African states
have had remarkably little contact with WEEA,
and SADC has had no involvement in WEEA. In
fact, of the 33 countries represented at WEEA's
organizational conference, Senegal was the only
Sub-Saharan African nation represented. This
paper introduces SADC and WEEA by presenting their backgrounds, goals and abilities. It then
exposes the general state of SADC's energy sector
and its need for development. Finally, It analyzes
SADC's developmental needs and WEEA's ability to address some of those needs, making it
clear that SADC has much to gain by participatingin WEEA.

Figure 1. SADC Countries

Background
The Southern African Development Council
SADC first emerged from a political relationship among five "Frontline States" (Angola,
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia)
who joined forces to combat white minority rule
in Rhodesia and South Africa. Later, when white
rule ended in Rhodesia, and as South Africa's
economic power began to overshadow its traditional military threat, the Frontline States turned
their attention to economic issues. Upon independence, Zimbabwe joined the Frontline States;
and soon thereafter Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland joined the effort to fortify themselves economically against South Africa's dominance.
Later when Namibia gained independence, it too
joined SADC, bringing SADC's total membership
to ten countries, comprising the entire tip of
southern Africa except for the Republic of South
Africa.
In October 1980, before Namibia gained
its independence, the nine other southern African
countries convened to determine a set of goals
and construct a formal organization to execute
those goals. This organizational conference, held
10
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in Lusaka, Zambia, determined four main objectives:
• "The reduction of economic dependence,
particularly, but not only on RSA [the Republic of South Africa];

Table 1. SADC Responsibilities Assigned to Each
Memb er C ountrv
SADC
Development
Subsector
Country
Sector
Energy conEnergy
Angola
servation and
security
Animal disease Telecommu
Botswana
control
nications
Lesotho
Soil conservation and Land
utilization
Fisheries, ForMalawi
Roads
estry, and
Wildlife
Mozambique Transportation Shipping
and Communications
Namibia

• The forging of links to create a genuine and
equitable regional integration;
• The mobilization of resources to promote
the implementation of national, interstate,
and regional policies;
• Concerted action to secure international
cooperation within the framework of the
strategy for economic liberation."
(Zehender 1983, 18)
Since that time, SADC has met yearly to discuss
developmental policies and coordinate development projects.
Due to the SADC states' vast political differences, the countries attending the Lusaka conference formulated a strategy that enabled cooperation without limiting the members' sovereignty. To protect the states' sovereignty, SADC
created a highly decentralized structure with a
very small central bureaucracy. The states agreed
to make all council decisions by consensus, and
to grant each state complete control of projects
within their territory. To enable coordination, on
the other hand, each state oversees one development sector for the entire SADC region. Several
countries also preside over sub sectors that more
evenly distribute Mozambique's weighty responsibility in the transportation sector (see Table 1).
The country responsible for each developmental
sector secures financial aid and other guidance
for projects throughout the region associated
with its sector. Angola bears responsibility for
SADC's energy sector.
Since its conception, SADC has played a
vital role in many developmental projects. The
leader of the Organization for African Unity
(OAU) describes SADC as "the most successful
regional grouping in Africa" (Botswana Daily
News 27 August, 1990). By 1988, SADC had
hosted 571 projects utilizing over seven billion
dollars of domestic and foreign funding
(Mulaisho 1988, 36). Due, however, to a civil war
in Angola, lack of resources, and lack of coordination with other developing countries, SADC
has accomplished little in the critically important
energy sector.

Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia

Zimbabwe

Manpower development
Industrial development
Southern African developmentfund,
Mining
Food security
plan,
Printing of
security papers

Airways

Railroads

Sources: (Anglin 1983, 693; Gambari 1991, 90).

The World Energy Efficiency Association
The World Energy Efficiency Association
originated in the United Nations' 1992 Earth
Summit. Of the many ideas developed in that
conference, the Atlantic Council of the United
States (a Washington, D.C. think tank) selected
several issues it found particularly important to
international affairs. The Atlantic Council assembled a working group of 73 energy experts from
around the world to develop a policy plan which
they presented in a policy paper entitled Energy
Technology Cooperation for Sustainable Economic Development (Atlantic Council of the
United States 1992).
In this policy paper, the experts recommended how governments could best assist the
world energy sector's development, particularly
in developing countries where energy needs are
11

Ellsworth - Southern African Development

growing rapidly (International Energy Agency
1982, 155). One of these recommendations received overwhelmingly positive feedback the
recommendation to form a "World Council for
Energy Efficiency." This organization would
serve three key purposes:
• "to serve as a clearinghouse for information
on energy conservation programs, technologies and measures;

The significance of these goals becomes more
evident when viewed in the context of SADC's
energy needs.

SADC's General State O/Energy
Development
Perhaps nowhere in the world is it as
evident as in the SADC countries that "energy
cuts across the whole of the economy, [and] its
crisis caused severe disruptions in virtually every
sector of society" (Bhagavan 1990, ix). In SADC,
as in most underdeveloped regions, the lack of
energy development negatively affects the
economy, the environment, the social structure
and the citizens' quality of life.
The SADC nations' energy sectors are
extremely limited when compared with the Republic of South Africa and its immediately dependent states (S.A.C.U.) and more so when
compared with the United States. Per capita energy consumption in the United States is three
hundred times that of Mozambique, meaning
that the average American uses almost as much
energy in one day as the average Mozambican
uses in a whole year. In spite of SADC members'
low consumption, all but Angola is forced to import much more energy than they export. Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania produce almost
no energy at all.
The limited state of energy development
alone is not necessarily negative--many developed nations are actively seeking to lessen their
energy consumption. Combined, however, with
the energy sector's nature and its environmental,
social, and economic impact, SADC's energy
sector does present some severe problems.
An underdeveloped energy sector negatively affects a countries' economic development
due to the "complex relationship between economics, energy and social development. The consumption and production of energy will shape
the pace and pattern of economic development
and the direction of social and institutional development" (International Energy Agency 1982,
154). As the energy sector falls, so does overall
economic growth (International Energy Agency
1982,159).
In terms of economic development, all
ten SADC countries combined have only one
third the gross national product of the Republic
of South Africa (Ellsworth 1993, 15). Furthermore, the average gross national product per

• to disseminate this information worldwide;
and
• to publicize international cooperation efforts in energy conservation."
(Atlantic Council of the United States 1992,
27)

To make the World Council for Energy
Efficiency a reality, the Atlantic Council's Office
of Energy and Environment formed an Organizational Committee. This committee established
a legal framework, compiled a list of potential
participants, and solicited the first year's funding.
On June 14, 1993, the World Energy Efficiency
Association became officially incorporated as a
private, non-profit organization. During the following two days, 63 world experts met in an organizational conference and decided that WEEA
should focus its attention on the following:
• "Develop a more comprehensive directory
of institutions interested in energy efficiency;
• Develop in-depth profiles of energy conservation centers;
• Prepare a guide to data bases on energy efficiency technologies;
• Assist members, in particular energy conservation centers, in establishing contacts
with knowledgeable institutions which can
help solve specific problems;
• Providing general comments on members
future programs;
• Help members to find information on general policies and programs which contribute to increased energy efficiency;
• Participate on a cooperative basis in conferences on energy efficiency;
• Prepare public relations material on energy
efficiency and conservation;
• Help coordinate voluntary support for individual members to the extent possible."
(World Energy Efficiency Association 1993)
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Table 2. Comparison of SADC Countries Energy Statistics.
SADC Country

Angola

Energyl
Production

32,259

Energy
Consumption

EnergyL
Consumption
per capita

Energy
Exports

Energy
Imports

848

89

29,817

21

°
°

279

Malawi

70

336

43

Mozambique

51

494

33

Tanzania

78

939

37

60

1,013

Zambia

1,425

1,887

240

248

881

Zimbabwe

5,373

6,574

720

82

1,401

S.A.C.U ..5

135,804

107,982

2,760

43,307

23,040

2,054,484

2,457,913

10,015

119,359

548,483

United States

546

Source: (United Nations 1990, 2-15)
1 All energy units except energy consumption per capita are measured in terms of 1,000 metric tons of coal
equivalent.
2 Energy consumption per capita is measured in terms of kilograms of coal equivalent.
3 The Southern African Customs Union, comprised of the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
and Swaziland.

capita of the SADC nations was only $340 in
1990, down form $380 in 1980 (Ellsworth 1993,
11). These countries, already desperate for financial assistance, are losing money on inefficient
and inappropriate means of energy production.
Not only does this deplete these countries' resources, but it also deters industrial development
which prefers cheap and abundant energy.
One of the most rapidly depleting resources resulting from SADC's energy needs is
wood. Low levels of energy development require
that most people rely on wood for energy which
leads to wood shortages. Wood burning currently comprises 79 percent of all SADC energy
consumption (Munslow et al. 1988, 5), which is
significantly higher than any other underdeveloped region (Frisch 1983, 65). Unsustainable
wood-burning destroys forests, which in turn
speeds up the process of desertification and
drives wildlife and people from their traditional
lands.
These effects impact the social structure
of a country, and the well being of its citizens
(Bhagavan 1990, xi). Because most people depend

on wood for their energy, fuelwood supplies are
rapidly diminishing in many areas of SADC
countries. Consequently, people must seek energy in other ways. Electricity, however, makes
up only 4.5 percent of SADC energy use, and
many rural villages are far from cities where
electricity is accessible (Bhagavan 1984, 40; Wisner 1984, 109).
As populations deplete the wood supply
and cannot find or create alternative energy
sources, they are compelled to move to locations
where energy is available. Many people move to
rapidly overcrowding cities where they can more
easily obtain energy sources such as electricity or
kerosene. This trend, in concert with other social
and environmental factors, contributes to massive urban migration. Between 1960 and 1985, the
percentage of the total population living in urban
areas grew dramatically. Zambian cities which
hosted only 17.2 percent of the total population
in 1960, housed 49.5 percent by 1985. Botswana's
urban populations grew from 1.8 percent to 19.2
percent during that same time (Munslow 1988,
112). Between 1985 and 1990, SADC urban
13
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populations were expected to rise an average of
about 7 percent per year whereas rural populations were expected to grow only 2 percent per
year (Munslow 1988, 112). This mass urbanization has altered the social fabric of the SADC
countries and contributes to unemployment,
health problems, and loss of traditional lifestyles.
Each of these problems (economy, environment, and urban migration) are further compounded by the anticipated trends in economic
and population growth--too little of the former
and too much of the latter. An underdeveloped
and inefficient energy sector not only restricts
economic growth but is also a result of poor
growth. As other countries develop, they will be

able to attain the economic resources needed to
develop their energy sectors, and improve their
electric grid (among other solutions) to relieve
much of the stress caused by an underdeveloped
and overtaxed energy sector. Southern Africa,
however, is not expected to experience the economic development which would be necessary to
accomplish this feat.
SADC countries experience economic
growth rates currently ranging from 10.2 percent
to -5.0 percent, and even those successful cases of
economic growth are lessened when population
growth is factored in. Consequently, the region is
experiencing negative GNP / capita growth.

. andE conomlc
·Grow thS tatishcs
Table 2 SADCPopu1ation
SADC
Population
Population
Pop. Growth
1993 in
Country
Doubling Time
Rate (in perthousands
(in years)
cent/year)

GNP Growth
(percent/year)

Angola

9,142

26

2.7

9.2

Botswana

1,327

26

2.7

10.2

Lesotho

1,896

27

2.6

1.9

Malawi

9,781

39

1.8

3.1

Mozambique

16,535

15

4.6

-5.0

Namibia

1,632

20

3.6

2.9

Swaziland

906

26

2.7

4.5

Tanzania

28,727

21

3.4

2.2

Zambia

9,048

20

3.5

-1.5

Zimbabwe

11,351

24

2.9

2.5

Source: (Broderbund Software 1993).

SADC's Energy Development Needs And
WEEA's Ability To Address Those Needs

As a result of these problems, SADC has
recognized that energy is an important developmental issue and has assigned Angola to
preside over energy development. Unfortunately, Angola has been unable to tackle so huge
a problem, and many energy developmental
needs remain unfulfilled.

Energy Efficiency
SADC needs a way to increase the
productive capability of its limited energy
resources. Because massive new power stations are neither affordable nor necessarily
helpful, SADC must focus its efforts on
other developmental strategies. Because of
the low amounts of capital required, the In14
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ternational Energy Agency has declared that
"increasing energy ... efficiency ... presents the
greatest potential for short-term improvements in the energy balances of developing
countries (1982, 167)."
The World Energy Efficiency Association focuses specifically on energy efficiency. In a variety of ways presented later,
WEEA encourages and enables developing
countries to improve the efficient production and consumption of energy.

wood per month rather than 264 (Munslow
1988, 124). Rural habitants could spend half
as much time collecting wood and spend
that time in more productive pursuits. Urban migration might slow and the environmental taxation would reach more sustainable levels.
This simple example demonstrates
potentially successful energy efficient development. Were such developmental techniques able to spread to other applicable
countries, they could benefit millions of
people. Having acknowledged this potential
benefit, WEEA planned one of its primary
purposes to serve as a clearinghouse for information on energy conservation programs
"and disseminating this information world
wide (Atlantic Council of the United States
1992,27)." The World Energy Efficiency Association, through access to large data bases,
can coordinate technologies with conditions
to find successful matches. Conditions in
SADC are very similar to other African and
developing countries, and it might be able to
profit from their experience.

Tailored Developmental Information
Specifically tailored advice and
guidance is crucial to the efficient production and use of energy. For decades, most of
the energy development effort in developing countries has been led by insufficiently
funded central governments or first world
private and governmental powers. Both of
these actors have too frequently looked to
developed nations to learn how best to develop their energy sector. Historically, this
approach has failed (Peet 1984, 83). The
problem lies in the vastly different conditions facing many third world countries as
compared with the developed world. Africa,
especially, needs tailored developmental assistance. One author claims that "Africa as
the poorest and most rural area of the world
experiencing some of the worst environmental problems is widely regarded as being particularly suitable for AT [appropriate
technology]" (Segal 1992, 124).
Where people depend almost exclusively on wood for their energy, effective
development is not necessarily found in
skyscrapers or nuclear power plants. Such
technologies are not necessarily suited for
SADC's present state of development. Instead, simpler technologies for burning
wood more efficiently may be much more
helpful. A simple metal ring surrounding
the fire will burn wood almost twice as efficiently as the three-stone fire traditionally
used in rural Africa; a kerosene pressure
stove is five times more efficient (Munslow
1988, 124). Considering SADC's heavy reliance on wood as an energy source, these
simple technologies could have a revolutionary effect. Ideally, substituting a simple
stove for the traditional three-stone fire pit
would cut SADC's fuel-wood consumption
in half, requiring only 132 kilograms of

Information Exchange
Not only is it important that SADC
countries exchange technology and experience with countries outside the region, but it
must also be able to efficiently exchange information and coordinate research among
its own members. Earlier efforts to achieve
this coordination through organizations
such as the Europe-Southern African Research Group (ESARG) or the Southern African Development and Research Association (SADRA) are often considered too outdated and repetitive to be useful (Brown
1989, 80). Therefore, some feel a great need
for a forum which could better disseminate
information and coordinate resources and
research efforts. WEEA could potentially act
to fill this void by not only establishing a
more efficient network base regarding energy efficiency research, professionals and
resources within SADC, but also by linking
that network to a world-wide net of similar
expertise and information.
International Recognition
SADC's plea for developmental assistance must be heard if it is to be answered; it needs international recognition.
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SADC represents a cause that many countries might like to assist, but without the
necessary publicity it is unlikely to receive
that assistance. Most of the first world does
not know SADC exists; only one institution
does any significant research concerning it-the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies. WEEA's founding president had no relationship with SADC (Guertin 1993). Other
African nations, however, know of its presence and potential; Dr. Youba Sokona, a
WEE A delegate from Senegal, stated that
SADC would be well suited to participant in
WEEA (Sokona 1993).
WEEA would provide SADC at
least two opportunities to gain publicity.
First, WEEA publishes a directory of energy
efficiency centers throughout the world.
SADC could be included in this publication.
Second, WEE A hosts conferences which
SADC representatives could attend.

fused to participate if the other were invited.
Eventually both agreed to participate.
Just as WEEA enabled Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China to form nonpolitical ties, WEEA could also help SADC
to form ties with South Africa and the rest of
the world in non-threatening relationships.
WEEA's non-imposing strategy could protect its members' sovereignty, while at the
same time enabling them to reap the benefits of broader cooperation.
Flexibility
SADC is now experiencing a transition phase; it needs the flexibility to adjust
to changing times. SADC is currently considering forming a regional free trade area
(Holman 1992, 8) and is adjusting to a
changing South Africa (Holman 1992, 6).
Consequently, SADC needs an organization
that allows and enables flexibility and
change.
WEEA provides SADC an opportunity to expand its degree of regional cooperation in both breadth and depth. WEEA
could provide expanded breadth through
cooperation on a world level, and it could
strengthen the depth of its focus in a very
crucial issue of economic development, the
efficiency of its energy sector. WEEA enables greater flexibility of action, without
compelling any action from its members.

Political Neutrality and Uninfringed
Sovereignty
Throughout SADC's existence, political neutrality has been necessary for its
survival. The ten member countries range in
governmental structure from democracies
(Namibia) to monarchies (Lesotho) to singleparty Marxist governments (Mozambique-until recently). They have always been careful not to infringe on each other's political
sovereignty by making every decision by
consensus. SADC even boasts it is "an organization which prides itself on moving at
the pace of the slowest member and thereby
never risking disagreement (Weisfelder
1991,5)." SADC decided that it was better to
transcend political differences for the common goal of development than to let the political differences interfere with the common
good. Any international organization in
which they participated would need to do
the same.
WEEA is politically neutral; it simply provides a service. For WEEA's purpose,
world wide participation is more important
that a political agenda. To achieve its purpose, WEEA encourages broad-based participation, and attempts to transcend political differences. This only becomes a problem
when mutually unrecognized countries are
both invited, as was the case with Taiwan
and the People's Republic of China. Each re-

Financial Assistance
Much of SADC's energies are spent
trying to locate international assistance for
developmental projects. WEE A is not capable of providing any direct funding, but it
could "help coordinate voluntary support
for individual members to the extent possible (World Energy Efficiency Association
1993)." Often a key to fund-raising is developing the necessary contacts. WEEA's networking approach would be invaluable in
such an effort.
Timeliness
WEEA's recent entrance onto the
world stage is ideal for SADC for two main
reasons: 1) SADC needs its assistance now
more than ever, and 2) if SADC participates
now, during WEEA's organizational stage, it
could exercise its influence over WEEA's
formation. Each is worth considering.
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First, SADC's economic, environmental and social needs demonstrate how
vital energy-efficient developmental assistance is. Especially in relation to the fuelwood crisis, SADC is quickly falling from its
precarious subsistence, scavenger economy
(Karenzi 1990, 43). As SADC faces soaring
population growth, bleak economic growth
rates, massive urban migration and environmental degradation, action now becomes
urgent. The Atlantic Council saw the urgent
need for WEEA while attending the United
Nation's Earth Summit. The international
community echoed that observation
(Atlantic Council 1992, 27).
Second, SADC could influence
WEEA's development to better meet SADC's
needs. Many issues in WEEA's organization
remain unsettled and will continue in a state
of flux during the formative years. In spite
of the low Sub-Saharan African representation at WEEA's organizational conference,
many developments are beginning to work
in SADC's favor. Even though Africa was
not well represented, the developing world
was represented by 37 participants who
have desires and needs similar to SADC's.
Membership dues for developing countries
are becoming substantially less than those
for institutions from developed countries.
The third world WEEA representatives also
strongly supported the establishment of regional WEEA offices, one of which would be
in Africa.

Recent events also have granted
Sub-Saharan Africa a greater direct influence over WEEA's formation. The sole SubSaharan African in attendance, Dr. Youba
Sokona, was nominated and confirmed to
the Board of Directors as a Vice Chairman as
well as a member of the Development and
Executive Committees. Another South African not in attendance was nominated to the
Nominating Committee.
To summarize SADC's needs and
WEEA's abilities to assist, note Table 3.

Conclusion
Today's world is filled with both
devastating needs and the ability to provide
solutions for many of those needs. Unfortunately, lack of coordination prevents many
of the world's ills from finding their cure.
Such a situation now faces SADC and
WEEA. WEEA is capable of providing
SADC a great service once the two organizations find one another.
WEEA is currently seeking out potential members, but the scope of this search
is so vast that it might completely pass over
SADC if someone does not bring it directly
to WEEA's attention. Consequently, the
Southern African Development Council
should take the initiative of contacting and
seeking to participate in the World Energy
Efficiency Association.
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Table 3. Comparison of SADC's Developmental Needs and WEEA's Ability to Fulfill those Needs.
WEEA's Abilities

SADC's Needs
Energy efficiency.

Assist energy-efficient development.

Applicable technological information.

Provide a clearinghouse for energy
efficiency technologies.
Link SADC with other developing
countries who have very similar
experiences and developmental conditions.

Information exchange within SADC

Provide structure for a database which could be
applied to an intra-regional technology network.

Access to the international community.

Provide a listing of energy efficiency centers
throughout the world.
Provide a database of many public and private institutions related to energy efficiency.

Publicity and recognition in the international
community.

Include SADC in international guides and databases.

Political neutrality and uninfringed state sovereignty.

WEEA is politically neutral and does not infringe
whatsoever on a state's sovereignty.

Flexibility.

WEEA would enable and allow change as SADC
faces transitional times.

Financial aid for development projects.

Unable to provide funding, but provides an excellent forum for creating contacts with potential
funders.

Timeliness.

SADC needs a forum like WEEA now.
WEEA is in its organizational stage and could be
influenced by SADC to better meet southern Africa's needs.
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Mormons and the Christian Right:
Are They "Right" for Each Other?
by Dan Elenbaas
The Christian Right represents one of the
most significant political movements in modern
U.S. history. Despite what many political analysts
and liberal activists have characterized as the decreasing influence of the conservative Christian
movement (see especially Frum 1994, 17; Jelen
1993, 178; and Jelen and Wilcox 1992, 199), the
Christian Right scored a major victory in the recent 1994 mid-term elections, helping the Republicans gain control of both houses of Congress for
the first time since the Eisenhower Administration. According to John Green, a Christian Right
expert at the University of Akron, twenty-four of
the thirty Christian Coalition-supported candidates he followed won their 1994 congressional
elections (Shanahan 1994, 3). The Coalition itself
takes credit for helping Republican candidates
win forty-four House Seats (including most of the
new seats), eight new Senate seats, and seven
governorships (American Political Network 1994).
Regardless of whose numbers are more correct,
no one is refuting that the Christian Right played
a significant and expanded role in this year's
elections.
As the nation's political scientists attempt
to unravel the mysteries behind the Republican
landslide of 1994, renewed attention is appropriately being given to the role of the Christian
Right. Among the important questions being
asked are, "what is the Christian Right?", "who is
included in the Christian Right?", and "what is
the future of the Christian Right?" A recent Campaign and Elections article attempting to answer
some of these questions, discussed how to best
classify members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (Mormons):

In this paper, I will show that Mormon
voting behavior has indeed been substantially
consistent with the Christian Right, and will attempt to provide reasons for the similarities. I
will also show, however, that despite the resemblances, there are many significant institutional,
historical, and cultural barriers to Mormon involvement in the political organizations that
comprise the Christian Right.

Background
The New Christian Right is the modern
incarnation of a long tradition of conservative
Protestant political activity in the United States.
Since the turn of the century, fundamentalist
Christians have coalesced into significant political movements at least three distinct times
(Wilcox 1992, 4-20). In the 1920s, the Christian
Right's first political battle was against the
teaching of evolution in public schools. Although
the anti-evolution movement enjoyed only limited success, their organizational and political
strategies were fairly sophisticated. Following a
relative decline in the 1930s and 1940s, the Christian Right reemerged in the fight against communism in the 1950s and 1960s. The third major
wave of conservative Christian activism, which
continues today, started in the mid-1970s with
the election of born-again Christian Jimmy Carter.
Since Carter's election over twenty years
ago, the New Christian Right (so called to distinguish itself from previous Christian Right
movements) has enjoyed mixed success. The
most notable organization of the late 1970s and
1980s was the Moral Majority, founded in 1978
by televangelist Jerry Falwell. After an initial period of high-profile success, the Moral Majority's
financial support waned, and in 1989 Falwell disbanded the organization after claiming that it had
achieved its goals. Pentecostal and Charismatic
Christians wasted no time in picking up where
Falwell left off. Pat Robertson, another popular
televangelist, immediately organized a new conservative religious organization called the Christian Coalition.

There is reasonable dispute over whether
all of the considerable Mormon influence
in the Utah Republican Party organization
should be considered as being part of the
Christian Right (Persinos 1994, 22).

The explanation for this "reasonable dispute" is
that while Mormons seem to behave and vote
like the Christian Right, they do not tend to belong to any of the organizations associated with
the Christian Right.
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in Utah appear to fit the Christian Right mold
perfectly.
Ideologically, there is consensus that
members of the Christian Right are predominantly conservative (Hamilton 1994, 28; Green,
Guth, and Hill 1993, 87; Wilcox 1989a, 403-4).
Data from the BYU exit poll shows that selfidentified "active" Mormons in Utah tend to consider themselves substantially more conservative
than their inactive-Mormon and non-Mormon
neighbors2 (see Figure 1).

Since its inception in 1989, the Christian
Coalition has become the leading Christian Right
organization in the u .S. The Christian Coalition
claims a current national membership of over 1.4
million members, organized in 1,144 chapters
and covering all fifty states (Griffith 1994, A10).
In the 1994 elections, this grass-roots oriented organization spent millions of dollars and passed
out over 33 million voter guides throughout the
country (Shanahan 1994, 3 ). A recent survey by
. Campaigns and Elections showed that the Christian
Right, primarily through the organizational
strength of the Christian Coalition, has become
the dominant working majority in eighteen state
Republican Parties, and has substantial strength
in thirteen other states (Persinos 1994, 22).
Like Jerry Falwell, who claimed to speak
for "'Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Mormons, and
Fundamentalists' seeking to restore moral equilibrium to the United States" (Wilcox 1992, xii),
the Christian Coalition is open to members of all
faiths. Despite their open-membership policy,
however, the Christian Coalition is primarily
comprised of fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and
Charismatic Christians. Mormon membership in
the Christian Coalition continues to remain small,
however, in spite of the fact that Mormons seem
to agree with the Christian Right on most of today' s political issues.

Ideology by Religion
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Figure 1 (Magleby 1994)

Similar Political Behavior
Data collected by the National Opinion
Research Center reveals that while 54 percent of
Mormons surveyed classified themselves as conservative, only 40 percent of Evangelical Protestants classify themselves that way (Wald 1992,
82). These studies confirm that Mormons are actually more conservative as a group than the fundamentalist Christians who comprise most of the
"official" Christian Right.
Another significant determinant of Christian Right membership is party affiliation. There is
a strong and continuous correlation between support of the conservative Christian movement and
identification with the Republican Party (Green,
Guth and Hill, 87; Wilcox 1989a, 404; Wilcox
1989b, 58). In Utah, 75 percent of all Mormon voters classified themselves as Republicans (Magelby
1994). Nationwide, according to data from the
National Opinion Research Center, 57 percent of
Mormons classified themselves as Republicans,
compared to only 33 percent of the Evangelical
Protestants (Wald 1992, 80). The relationship between Mormons and the Republican party is espe-

Defining the Christian Right can be very
difficult. Some analysts limit membership to
born-again Christians, while others include only
those who are dues-paying members of Christian
Right organizations (Hamilton 1994, 28). The first
method is not particularly useful in analyzing
Mormon membership in the Christian Right because Mormons mayor may not be considered
"born-again"; the second method is flawed in the
same way that saying only those who pay dues
to the Democratic party should be considered
Democrats. A more valid measure of membership in the Christian Right movement is political
behavior. In this respect, Mormons seem to fit the
Christian Right mold quite well. Data from the
1994 KBYU /Utah Colleges Exit Poll administered
by Dr. David Magleby, Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University 1, shows a
strong correlation between the voting attitudes
and behavior of Mormons and the attitudes and
behaviors that characterize the conservative
Christian movement. Particularly in terms of ideology, partisanship, and social issues, Mormons
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cially clear when looking at the recent voting behavior of "active" Mormons in Utah (Figure 2).

Christian Right. Based on their political behavior
patterns, Mormons should be included in the
Christian Right.

Statewide Active-Mormon Vote

Reasons for the Similarities

90%

The similarities in political attitudes and
behavior between Mormons and the conservative
Christians can be substantially accounted for by
key similarities in their religious values, beliefs,
and practices. While both sides may be hesitant
to admit it, there is significant overlap in the
doctrines of the Mormon church and the various
Protestant churches typically associated with the
Christian Right. These overlaps are in areas that
bare a direct relationship to political behavior.
One significant indicator of support for
the Christian Right is an individual's level of religiosity. It has been shown that members of the
Christian Coalition are considerably more active
in their religious worship than members of their
faith who are not part of the Coalition (Wilcox
1989b, 57). Based on the data from the 1994
KBYU /Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 78 of the respondents were Mormon, and over 90 percent of those
considered themselves religiously active. How
does religiosity translate into participation in the
conservative Christian movement? It seems the
more devout an individual is in his or her faith,
the more likely he or she will attempt to actively
promote the values associated with that faith.
In the effort to promote the values connected with their respective religious traditions,
the fact that Mormons and members of the
Christian Right have been shown to take substantially similar positions on most contemporary
issues is not a fluke. Although there are important theological differences between the Mormons and the fundamentalist Protestants, they
both believe that the Bible is the word of God, that
Jesus Christ is divine, and that he will return to
the earth to rule during a Millennium of peace.
Both groups are guided by Biblical commandments against adulterous sexual relationships
(including a prohibition of homosexuality),
against abortion, and against many other modern-day vices.
The combination of similar moral codes
based on Christian teachings and high levels of
religiosity equates to Mormon and Christian
Right political behaviors that seem to mirror each
other. Based on this data alone, one would presume a high-level of Mormon membership in the
various Christian Right organization. A closer
look, however, will show that this is not the case.
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•Although popular conservative Democratic incumbent Bill
Orton easily won reelection in Utah' s 3rd Congressional District, when voters were asked whether they would support a
Republican or Democrat if Bill Orton was not running, an
overwhelming majority said they would choose the Republican.

Once again, Mormon party identification and
voting behavior appear to make them natural
candidates for inclusion with the Christian Right.
A third well-established measure of support for the Christian Right is position on certain
social issues. Members of the Christian Right
tend to hold conservative positions on most social issues such as abortion and school prayer
(Wald, 227-78). As shown below, active Mormons
take very conservative positions on these and
other contemporary social issues (Figure 3).
Active-Mormon Issue Positions
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Figure 3 (Magleby 1994)

By nearly every measure, Mormons seem
to be more conservative, more Republican, and
more in-line with Christian Right issue positions
than most other religious groups that currently
constitute the conservative Christian movement.
In terms of ideology, party affiliation, and social
issues, Mormons may even "out-right" the
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Different Motivations, Different Tactics

remain as politically subtle as possible in order to
appeal to the greatest number of potential converts. This focus not only applies to the church as
an institution, but also has a significant impact on
the lives and levels of political activism of its
members.
For active Mormons, the church is second only to the family in terms of loyalty and
participation. The Mormon church requires such
a high level of commitment and activity from its
members that participation in other outside
groups is typically limited. This is due in part to
the lay nature of the Mormon church, in part to
the doctrinal focuses of the importance of the
family, and in part to the many time-consuming
programs (including missionary work) implemented by the church. Participation in outside
groups, especially ones with near-religious vigor
like the Christian Right, is difficult for active
Mormons due to the established loyalties and
significant time constraints resulting from membership in their church.
In addition to the more practical considerations, however, there is a deeper, historical
reason Mormons have excluded themselves from
Christian Right organizations. Much of the substantial persecution levied upon the Mormon
church and its members in the nineteenth century
was at the hands of the members of the same
churches that now make up the New Christian
Right. Although manifestations of the enmity
between the Mormons and fundamentalist
Christians have toned down over the years, an
underlying intolerance remains. A 1985 study of
religious social distance in the u.S. found that the
"greatest degree of intolerance or social distance
manifest by one religious group towards another
is that of the Conservative Christians for the
Mormons" (Brinkerhoff, Jacob, and Mackie 1985,
241).
The intolerance for Mormons held by
many fundamentalist Christians is no secret.
Even in their attempts to welcome Mormons into
their organizations, fundamentalist Christians
often refer to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints as a "non-Christian cult" - a very offensive characterization to Mormons. At a recent
Christian Coalition Conference, an evangelical
was overheard saying that "even though Mormons are a cult, they are welcome in the common
moral cause" (Witham 1994, A4). To many Mormons, these hardly represent words of welcome.
As a consequence of Fundamentalist antipathy toward them, Mormons are unlikely to

While similarities in political behavior
can be attested to the Mormons' similar religious
values, that same value structure also results in
several important differences between Mormons
and the Christian Right. These deeply rooted differences have been strong enough to preclude
Mormons from active participation in Christian
Right organizations, and will likely continue to
have that effect. Some of the reasons for lack of
Mormon participation are the role, policies, and
mission of the Mormon church itself, the animosity between Mormons and fundamentalist
Christian groups, and the cultural tradition and
history of Mormons.
One major reason for the lack of Mormon
membership in the formal organizations of the
New Christian Right is the official policies of
their church regarding institutional political involvement. The church itself employs a specific
policy of political non-involvement which prohibits the use of church resources and facilities
for political causes (Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints 1985, 11-12). While this does not
mean that the Mormon church is apolitical (it has
taken positions on several moral-political issues),
it is a significant contrast to the norms of political
participation in fundamentalist Christian
churches, where religious leaders often play a
primary role in politics (e.g., Jerry Falwell and
Pat Robertson).
In an article examining the relationship
of the Mormon church to the then popular Moral
Majority, Brinkerhoff, Jacob, and Mackie (1985,
243) conclude that not only is the Mormon
church non-political, but that open political involvement is actually inimical to the stated
"mission" of the proselytizing church:
The attempt to build the Church (for
Mormons this means gaining converts)
through the presentation of the virtues of
Mormon culture (emphasis on the family,
achievements of members, etc.) requires a
focus of energies and a distancing from
extremism .... The late Mormon President
Spencer W. Kimball exemplified this focused pragmatism when he stated that
while there were some political issues on
which the Church might take an institutional stand ... , a broad-based political activism should be avoided since "the result
would be to divert the Church from its basic mission of teaching the restored gospel
of the Lord to the world."
Rather than the widespread integration of politics and religion found in fundamentalist Christian churches, the Mormon church has tried to
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feel comfortable associating with one of the main
sources of anti-Mormon literature. As recently as
the 1994 elections, Mormons were credited with
helping defeat what would normally be considered a doctrinally sound anti-gay measure in
Idaho (Dunlap 1994, 9). Mormon opposition to
the initiative was due in part to their historical
memory of being persecuted as a minority group,
and in part as a response to revelations that the
bill's sponsors hired the same film studio that
was used to promote the highly publicized antiMormon film, "The Godmakers" (Trillhaase 1994,
B2). It is exactly this kind of case that shows how
Mormon political behavior is significantly impacted by their unique religious goals and cultural history.
In addition to helping defeat the Christian Right's anti-gay efforts in Idaho, Mormons
and Mormon politicians have often departed
from their staunch conservative positions, especially when the rights of a minority group are affected. Although Mormon Representative Earnest
Istook (R-Oklahoma) has been selected by new
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to "take the
lead on school prayer" (Merida and Dewar 1994,
AI), renowned Mormon Senator Orrin Hatch (RUtah) has attempted to playa moderating role on
such important Christian Right issues as school
prayer, abortion, and term limits (Roderick 1994,
170, 213). While neither Hatch nor Istook officially represent the Mormon community, they are

representative of the sometimes unpredictable
political behavior of Mormons.

Conclusions
The data is incontrovertible: Mormon
political behavior on an individual level qualifies
them to be included in the broad definition of the
Christian Right. Mormons tend to be ideologically conservative, they tend to be Republicans,
and they tend to hold traditional positions on social issues. Much of the similarity between Mormons and the Christian Right can be ascribed to
the similarities of their value systems. Although
theologically different, both have many key doctrines in common.
In spite of their agreement on most socioreligious issues, as Brinkerhoff, Jacob, and
Mackie (1987, 247) aptly put it,
... the dynamics of Mormon organizational
culture, however, with its emphasis on respectability and moderation and a religious pragmatism that channels most of its
energies into church expansion, makes
ongoing alliances problematic.

Mormons may act like they belong to the Christian Right, but because of the institutional requirements and doctrinal differences of the
Mormon church, together with the historical enmity between the two groups, Mormons will
likely never become a significant part of the formal conservative Christian movement.
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NOTES
1 The

2

1994 KBYU /Utah Colleges Exit Poll surveyed over 7,000 Utah voters in ninety polling places on
November 8,1994.

Active LDS includes voters who classified themselves as either "very active LDS" or "somewhat active
LDS." Inactive LDS includes voters who classified themselves as either "not very active LDS" or
"not active LDS." Non-LDS includes all other voters.
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The Supreme Politics:
A Study of Partisan Influences on the u.S. Judiciary
by Dana Morrey
Have other nominees been victims of the same
fate? What role does party politics play in the
Supreme Court? What role does it play in the judicial branch as a whole?
It is clear that "political party considerations are hardly absent from the judiciary (Beck
and Sorauf 1992, 419)." While not as visible as in
other branches of government, partisanship plays
a role in shaping the nature of the judicial branch,
including the Supreme Court. Party politics and
partisanship can impact the members of the
Court and judiciary in four ways: First, partisan
influences on the selection process itself; second,
in the confirmation arena; third, in judging cases
while on the bench; and fourth, party considerations on the subject of retirement. Each of these
areas of party influence will be examined in detail.

In 1981, first-year President Ronald Reagan nominated Sandra Day O'Connor to replace
retiring Justice Potter Stewart to assume the role
of Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. The Republican-controlled Senate easily
confirmed Justice O'Connor in a convincing 99-0
vote. Five years later Reagan nominated Justice
William Rehnquist to succeed Warren Burger as
Chief Justice, and Antonin Scalia to assume
Rehnquist's position. Again both nominations
were given to a Republican Senate, and again
both nominees were confirmed. Scalia gained a
98-0 Senate vote, and even the proven strict conservative Justice Rehnquist weathered a filibuster
intended to block his promotion, and was confirmed by a 65-33 margin. In 1987, Reagan again
had the chance to name a justice to the Supreme
Court, and he offered another known conservative, convinced the confirmation would be as
easy as the last three. Robert Bork, however, was
rejected by a 58-42 vote on October 23, 1987. On
October 29, 1987, Reagan tried again, nominating
Douglas Ginsburg, only to see this nomination
withdrawn after heated Senate debates. It was
only with third-choice Anthony Kennedy that
Reagan found success, as Kennedy was confirmed by a 99-0 vote on February 3, 1988
(Massaro 1990,157-58).
What was the difference between Reagan's failed nominations and the successful ones?
What had changed that turned a president with
an excellent nomination track-record into a twotime nomination loser? Could the Reagan Administration have avoided these failed attempts
to confirm a conservative justice to the Supreme
Court bench?
Former Reagan staff members must still
muse about these questions. One explanation that
is obvious, perhaps even too obvious, and therefore is easily overlooked. The successful Reagan
nominations were handed to a Senate controlled
by the Republican Party, and the failed attempts
were handled by a Democratically-controlled
Senate. Did the divided party control of the
presidency and the Senate cause the downfall of
Bork and Ginsburg? If so, to what extent can
party politics be blamed for failed nominations?

To Nominate the "Party Man"
There is no question that party considerations playa role in determining who a President will choose to nominate. Theodore Roosevelt, in considering a Supreme Court nomination,
once wrote:
[But] in the higher sense, in the proper
sense, [a Supreme Court Justice] is not in
my judgment fitted for the position unless
he is a party man, [and aj constructive
statesman (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 421).

Clearly, Theodore Roosevelt is not alone among
presidents who nominate "party men" (or today
including "party women") to fill the Supreme
Court. Since the Eisenhower Administration,
only two nominations have been put forth involving a nominee that was not from the president's own party; William Brennen by Eisenhower, and Lewis Powell by Nixon (Ducat and
Chase 1992, AI7-AI9). This pattern of partisan
selection is also seen in Table I, which lists the
percentage of lower federal judicial appointments that belong to the same party as each
president, beginning with Grover Cleveland:
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Table 1. Percent of Judicial Appointments to Federal
District and Appeals Courts From the Party of the
President

ously, abortion played such a role in the Republican's view of judicial selection in the 1980s.
Candidates for nomination also contribute to this "indirect" party influence by activating
party connections to "make their name known"
for possible nomination. Federal district court
judge Joseph Perry, referring to his federal appointment, once stated, "If I wanted that appointment, I had better get back into politics-which I did" (Ball 1980, 186). Ball continues this
reasoning by stating the following:

~=---~~--------------~~---

Cleveland
Harrison
McKinley
T. Roosevelt
Taft
Wilson
Harding
Coolidge
Hoover
F. Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
Clinton (to June 1994)

97.3
87.9
95.7
95.8

82.2
98.6
97.7
94.1
85.7
96.4
90.1
94.1
90.1
94.4
92.9

... [potential nominees] have preparedJor
this moment by joining the appropnate
party organization, by working tirelessly
for the party, by supporting the party .organization candidates, by contributIng
time and money to the party, and by befriending men who ultimately become
senators, congressmen, governors, etc.
(1980, 186).

81.2
90.3
93.1
89.0
88.0

Thus, even the potential nominees themselves
have accepted the reality that ascending to the
Supreme Court bench generally requires prior
experience at a lower federal bench. Often, nomination to a federal bench is possible only by establishing contacts among government officials.
This is most easily accomplished by ascending in
the party ranks.

Sources: Sheldon Goldman, "The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition," Judicature 74 (April/May
1991), pp. 298-99; Sheldon Goldman and Matthew D. Saronson, "Clinton's Nontraditional Judges: The Triumph of Affirmative Action," Judicature 78 (Sept.!October 1994); also
Paul Allen Beck and Frank J. Sorauf, "Party Politics in America," HarperCollins Publishers (1992), p.422.

Confirmation Partisan Conflict

From this table it is clear that presidents seem to
have no difficulty making a strong majority of
their selection and appointment decisions along
party lines. The notable exception to this general
rule was former President Jimmy Carter, who
attempted to establish a "merit-based" system of
selecting federal judges (Ball 1980, 172). This innovation never got by the Senate, and ironically,
Carter maintained a 90.3% party selection rating.
Therefore, partisanship can be a critical
factor in the selection process, and in some cases
perhaps a more significant effect may be felt. In
the 1980 Republican Party platform, for example,
was the promise to appoint more judges who
upheld the "sanctity of life." This interesting political plank roughly translates to a call for judges
who would be pro-life on the abortion issue. This
shows that the treatment of an issue by the judiciary can become important to political parties.
The parties, in turn, try to "regain control" of the
issue by demanding the selection of judges
whose opinions are in line with the parties'
opinions. What better place to find such judges
than within the respective party itself? Obvi-

After the selection has been made, the
confirmation process begins. Perhaps in this area
especially the influence of party and partisan behavior is most strongly visible.
Clearly, partisan differences will be most
evident in the cases of failed nominations. According to John Massaro, there are three leading
factors which could move the Senate to oppose a
confirmation: 1) the nominee's ideology, 2) the
nominee's party affiliation, and 3) nonideological considerations (1990, 1). Massaro
further suggests that ideological opposition alone
would likely not bring about a Senate's disapproval, and either would strict partisan concerns,
as the Scalia and O'Connor votes show. There are
two conditions, however, that when present can
bring ideological concerns or partisan concerns to
the surface which will more likely block a nomination. These two conditions are: 1) the majority
of the Senate does not share the same party affiliation as the president, and 2) the nomination is
forwarded to the Senate in the last full year of a
president's term. Table 2 shows the Senate's refusal rates when one or both of these conditions
is present.
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Table 2. Senate Rates of Refusal to Confirm, 1789-1988

Presence of Unfavorable
Conditions of Senate or Timing

Nominations
Made
Refused

Neither condition present
One condition present
Both conditions present
Total

92

36
14
142

Rate of
Refusal

9
7
10
26

10%
19%

71%
18%

Source: John Massaro, "Supremely Political," State University of New York Press (1990), p. 136.

serious non-ideological, non- partisan
grounds for opposing confirmation can be
critical in activating this opposition (1990
147).
'

Notice how refusal rate increased by 9%
when one of the negative conditions is present,
but jumps to an astounding 71 % when both conditions are present (1990, 135-7). These data can
be cause for concern for a last-year Senateopposed president.
The data from Table 2 suggest that partisan or ideological motivations for rejecting a
nominee may lie dormant until one or both of
these conditions come into play. This may explain the failures of the Fortas, Haynsworth, Carswell, Bork, and Ginsburg nominations as one or
both of these conditions were present in each.
Both of these considerations can be called "partybased" as the first obviously taps the natural opposition the Senate controlled by the opposing
party will feel toward the president, and the second as it taps into the "lame-duck" situation a

Such non-partisan concerns can serve as a rallying point for those who truly oppose the nomination on ideological or partisan grounds. This
particular phenomena was most recently evident
in the Ginsburg nomination where his past experience with marijuana became the focal point of
the confirmation debates, and ultimately forced
Ginsburg's withdrawal.
Not to overstate the role of the party in
the nomination process, Massaro makes it clear
the ideology plays the "dominant role" when
looking at reasons for opposition. This was seen
in the Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell nominations as the following table, which focuses on
the "deviant votes" of the Senate, illustrates:

Tabl~ 3.

peviant Votes Generated by Party And Ideology: the Fortas, Haynsworth Carswell and Bork
Nommations
'
,

Fortas
Haynsworth
Carswell
Bork

Nominee Votes
Deviating from Party
29

36
30

Votes Deviating
from Ideology
9
17
7

Change in Deviant
Votes with Ideology
-20
-19

8

16

+8

-23

Source: John Massaro, "Supremely Political," State University of New York Press (1990), p. 170.

president may be in during that final year. There
is also the prospect of the opposition winning the
presidency and thus filling the seat themselves.
Election considerations may also activate the
partisan opposition around certain ideological issues of the moment.
Other non-ideological or non-partisan issues might also surface that will activate dormant
ideological or partisan opposition. As Massaro
states:

This data clearly shows that ideology was a key
reason for senators to deviate from their party
and oppose the nomination. The Bork data seems
to suggest that partisanship was actually a
stronger factor than, ideology but this data may
simply be the result of stronger ideological parties at the time of Bork's confirmations, or the
partisan and political need to support a popular
President Reagan. Whatever the reason for ultimate partisan voting regarding Bork, it was clear
in the debates that the opposing Senators' primary concerns centered on his "extreme" ideology. A more recent example that shows the superior position of ideology is the withdrawn nom i-

... a president must always be concerned
about nominating an individual to the
Court who is vulnerable on non- ideological, non-partisan grounds. Given the latent
ideological opposition confronting all Supreme Court nominations, the presence of
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American people, who evidently are on
their side (1994, 81).

nation of Lani Guinier during Clinton's administration. The Senate was held by the Democrats
at that time, and it was Clinton's first year as
president, so the Guinier nomination should
have been easy by the original "conditions"
model. Guinier's ideology was so at odds with
even the most liberal Democrats, however, that
Ted Kennedy, probably the most liberal of them
all, stated that Guinier's views were "a threat to
the Constitution." With such obvious ideological
opposition, Clinton was forced to withdraw the
nomination (Carter 1994, 35-53).
Thus, while party and partisanship play
a secondary role to ideology, there is no question
that it plays some role, if not a significant one. It
is as John Frank stated about the Fortas failure:
"the entire process, from one end to the other,
was hardball politics (Frank 1991, 133)."

So while few judges would admit their reasoning
on a decision is based on partisan holdings, and
few presidents would care to admit they want to
pack the Court, it is clear there is at least some
connection between the decision-making process
of a justice and the party affiliation of that justice,
and this connection cannot be totally eliminated.
John Gates outlines three major theories
important to understanding the dynamic of partisan behavior in Supreme Court adjudication.
These are: 1) the Legitimation Thesis, 2) the Delegitimizing Role, and 3) the Agenda-Setting Role.
One of the more pervasive roles given to
the Supreme Court is that it serves to legitimize
the policies of the other branches of government,
especially the executive, who has the power to
change the Court make-up. This position was
first advanced by Robert Dahl in 1957 and has
gained some support over the years from Charles
Black and others. The most important conclusion
to draw from this theory, states Dahl, is that

Judicial Partisan Activism?
The third area of party influence on the
Supreme Court revolves around the actual adjudicating once a nominee successfully attains office. It is, however, more difficult to show partisan influences when the Court has a strong tradition of relying on legal precedent and established legal test. Still, as Professor Jack Peltason
once noted, "the decision as to who will make the
decisions affects what decisions will be made
(Peltason 1955, 29)."
Along these same lines Ball noted the
following:

... policy views dominant on the Court are
never for long out of line with the policy
views dominant among the law making
majorities of the U.S. Instead of serving as
a protector of minority interests, the Court
serves to enhance majoritarian democracy
by conferring the approval of the mud\.revered Constitution on the policies of the
other branches (1957, 285).

Thus, according to this view, the Court has an
inherent nature to eventually support the policies
of the majority, and often these policies align
along partisan lines.
The second theory sees the role of the
Court in an opposite light. The supporters of this
theory assert the Court:

Who hears the case often determines the
outcome of the case; the turn of mind of
the judge is often the decisive factor in the
outcome of the litigation. This fact has not
escaped the notice of the president (1980,
160).

Indeed, history provides ample examples
of presidents who hoped to "stack the Court"
with strong partisans that would be more likely
to agree with the president's own policies.
Franklin Roosevelt tried to increase the number
of justices allowed to sit on the Supreme Court
bench in order to pack the Court with supporters
of his New Deal social reforms. Reagan and the
Republicans also hoped to pack the Court in order to overrule Roe v. Wade and abortion rights.
As Stephen Carter stated:

... will find itself in conflict with Congress
following a critical election. The role of the
Court may be to impede the policymaking
of new majorities ushered into power in
one or more critical elections .... The Supreme Court remains as custodian of the
old regime's ideology .... Richard Funston
has termed this period [between the critical election and replacement of "old regime" justices] as the "lag" Reriod, when
the Court is ideologically behind majoritarian forces (1992, 15).

Thus, the Court's partisan make-up may be in
conflict with a newly elected government, and
these forces may sway the decisions of the justices who are now "the last defense of the upset
party." This theory has some historical support
most notably when John Adams attempted to

This is certainly true on abortion, where
pro-life and pro- choice forces alike have
insisted on the privilege of packing the
Court. Naturally, they have done so not in
the name of partisanship but that of the
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"stack" the judiciary with loyal Federalists after
the party's crushing defeat by the JeffersonianDemocrats in the election of 1800. Led by John
Marshall, these Federalists did at times effectively block the implementation of new policy by
the new government.
The final theory applied to partisan
Court behavior also centers on critical elections.
The Agenda-Setting Role Theory asserts that before a critical election, the Court can playa significant role in "setting the agenda" or positions
of the majority party. Gates states:

trial, served to mobilize women, and feminists in
particular, against President Bush and the Republican Party (Smith 1993, 126-30). This may
partially explain the party's loss of the female
vote in the 1992 elections. This analysis suggests
that regardless of supposed unbiased judgments,
the effects of Supreme Court decisions can effect
the partisanship of the electorate.

The Party's Last Call
The final area in which Supreme Court
justices reveal some partisan motivations is in the
selection for a time of retirement. Justice Thurgood Marshall was reluctant to retire while a Republican was president. Justice Marshall was a
devout liberal who did not like the idea of being
replaced by another of Reagan's "ultraconservatives." Clearly, Justice Marshall hoped to
hold on to his position until he could be replaced
by a Democratic president's nominee. Unfortunately for Marshall, his health could not withstand eight years of Reagan and four more years
of Bush, and he was forced to retire during the
term of the Bush presidency (Smith 1993, 45).
Ironically, Marshall was replaced by what must
have been his worst nightmare, Clarence Thomas, who immediately joined the extremely
right-wing faction of Scalia and Rehnquist once
in the Court. Clearly, this was the very thing
Marshall had hoped to avoid.
The experience of Marshall is not unique.
Most justices make it no secret they hope to retire
during the administration of a president whose
party affiliation agrees with their own. Professor
Rainey, in studying the retirement patterns of
federal-level judges, found the following:

during times of instabilitr in the parties,
the Court has an unusua opportunity to
shape the majority party's position on the
realigning issues. This is consistent with
Dahl's (1957, 294) observation over
twenty-five years ago: 'There are times
when the coalition is unstable with respect
to certain key policies; at very great risk to
it legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in such cases and may succeed in
establishing policy (1992, 20).

This theory also has some historical evidence to
support its claims. David Adamany's analysis of
the historical record of two critical presidential
election periods, 1896 and 1960-1964, finds that
"the Court played a significant role in setting the
majority party's position, which was later vindicated at the ballot box {Gates 1992, 20)." Whichever theory is most accurate does not change
their common assertion that party politics and
partisanship play some role in the judgments of
the Court.
It should be noted, however, that these
theories describe the relationship of the Court to
the large political environment. The actual internal working of the Court are largely void of party
influences. The justices do not organize in partisan blocs, they shift voting coalitions often, they
are not effected by their own reelection concerns,
and they do not interact with party leadership in
general. Still, as was already mentioned, it is often difficult to draw a distinction between ideology and party bias when deciding issues. Years
of partisan involvement may be difficult to set
aside with true objectivity. Ultimately, the Court
remains a "political" body.
Supreme Court justices may not be the
only ones effected by the partisan forces involved
in the selection and adjudicating of the Court.
Christopher Smith argues that the controversial
nomination and strictly conservative judgments
of Justice Clarence Thomas, and the effects of the
Anita Hill testimony during his confirmation

Of those who reached eligibility for retirement prior to 1975 and who had a
known party identification, 35% of Supreme Court justices, 45% of Court of Appeals judges, and 51 % of District Court
Judges took retirement while their party
was in office. Among the Apl?eals and
District judges there is substantIal contingent who bring to the bench political loyalties that encourage them, more often
than not, to maneuver their departure in
such a way that will maximize the chance
for the appointment of a replacement by a
president of their party (1976, 1).

Thus, while Supreme Court justices do not seem
to follow this trend of partisan-influenced retirement as strongly as lower-level judges, it is clear
that some do, and party considerations are never
completely absent in the decision to retire. Certainly, Marshall's experience can attest to that.
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nomination taking place? Does the candidate
have non-ideological characteristics that might
adversely polarize the Senate vote? What implications will the candidate's likely ideology and
judgment behavior have on the issues that are
partisan "flashpoints?" All of these question
should be looked at carefully in each nomination
a president considers.
In this way, the president can better organize his resources for "battle" if necessary, or
quietly pull out a nominee before a drawn-out
and potential damaging debate series. Perhaps if
Reagan had better considered these factors in
1987, he could have mobilized enough support to
confirm Bork, and he certainly would have
avoided offering Ginsburg as his "sacrificial
lamb." President Clinton may well have avoided
the embarrassment of the Lani Guinier withdrawal. Clearly, these partisan factors should always have a strong impact on the president's
choices.
Finally, the president must set aside any
lingering strong beliefs in the "neutral integrity"
of the Supreme Court, for in the end as Massaro
states, "the Senate's action in refusing to confirm
some future Supreme Court nominee will be, as it
always has been, supremely political" (1990, 197).
Thus, to work in a political system, the judiciary
too must remain political.

In conclusion, it is clear that party and
partisanship definitely playa role in the judicial
branch and in the selection, nomination, adjudication, and retirement plans of Supreme Court
justices. Gates summarizes this fact in the following:
The traditional idea of the judicial function is that it is essentially nonpolitical.
... This portrayal of the judicial function,
however, is rejected by social scientists.
... The realists observed that when precedents are available as a guide to resolving
a legal dispute, judges can often distinguish or overrule precedents. ImRlicit in
this view is the assumption that the attitudes and values of individual judges affect their perception of valid claims ....
In the modern view of the judicial process
there is also a recognition that courts make
policy simply as a matter of function. Judicial decisions will aid certain values and
societal interests over others .... Discretion
is often available to judges, and at the level
of Supreme Court adjudication, few cases
are unimportant (1992,10-12).

So what are the implications of partisan
influence for a president who seeks the confirmation of his nomination? Clearly, the president
must look at the relevant factors in each case. Is
the current Senate majority from the opposing
party? How far into the presidential term is this
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Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press. By Richard Davis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 193p.
No doubt Americans have been debating
the role of the United States Supreme Court since
the Federalist Papers. Some believe the Court
should be active, some believe the Court should
be more reticent, some believe the Court should
strictly interpret the Constitution, some believe a
more "loose" interpretation is required. In the
midst of these debates, Richard Davis has suggested another perspective to consider: the
Court's interaction with the media and the effect
this interaction has on the general public.
In Decisions and Images, Davis has two
main contentions. First, Davis argues that the
Court (contrary to traditional belief) is a political
institution and, as a political institution, must
pursue specific relations with the press in order
to maintain public support. Second, Davis believes that each individual justice has opinions,
aims, and objectives separate from the objectives
of the Court, and the justices try to achieve their
aims through separate interactions with the
press.
To argue his position, Davis first presents
the theoretical background, induding which images the Court must sustain images of unanimity,
of independence, of distance, and of immunity in
order to achieve its institutional objectives of deference and compliance. As Davis discusses how
justices interact with the press and what the motivations of each are in their interaction, he consistently returns to the images and the objectives
that the Court must preserve. He suggests, for
example, that the Court's images were threatened
in the 1930s. The Court seemed unwilling to

the public perceives it and actively work to perpetuate positive images.
Richard Davis' thesis is quite interesting.
It is a tricky argument however. Davis argues
that the Court wants to perpetuate an "image" of
aloofness, an image of simply focusing on duty,
of independence from public pressure. Preserving these particular images is rather difficult.
Davis recognizes the paradox when he notes,
"[t]his is the crux of the paradox in imagemaking--to engage in imagemaking while denying its
existence to maintain the image" (9). Despite the
fact that he recognizes the difficulty, it seems that
Davis finds it difficult at times to discuss how it
is that the Court is actively perpetuating its image
of doing its job--rather than simply doing its job.
For example, it is no doubt true that the "[n]ews
of the u.s. Supreme Court is the product of the
interaction between the justices and the reporters
who cover them" (144). Moreover, it is quite obvious that by picking certain cases and denying
others, the Court is "successful at setting the
agenda for press coverage" (144). Simply by virtue of doing its job, the Court decides what will
become newsworthy. However, there seems to be
a missing link between the Court doing its job
(and choosing whether or not to hear cases), and
the Court choosing cases in order to purposely
"[offer] the news it wants the press to cover," or,
in other words, the Court choosing cases to purposely perpetuate an image (144). The distinction
is difficult to define because it is in part a distinction between what is and what appears to be-and with an organization that is (or, at least, appears to be) as aloof and private as the U.S. Supreme Court, the distinction is not always obvious.
Davis presents his arguments and supports them by discussing the everyday role of the
press at the Court as well as everyday role of the
Court. He argues that the justices and the reporters engaged to cover the Court are involved in an
intricate "dance," a dance that the justices are
"leading." "By limiting press access with one
hand and simultaneously feeding the press with
the other, the Court is acting much like other political institutions, especially the presidency, in

... sanction the constitutionality of the New
Deal. Severe criticism of the Court's decisions arose from some prominent newspapers. Harlan Stone commented in a letter to his sister at the end of the 1935 term:
'We finished the term of Court yesterday. I
think in many ways one of the most disastrous in its history. (31)

Without public support, it was possible for
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to question the number of justices on the Court and to suggest
changes. Pointing to this example and others,
Davis argues that the Court must care about how
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an image of disinterestedness or whether they
simply are disinterested is difficult to determine.
Despite the difficulty in overcoming this
paradox once and for all, Davis' book is well
worth reading. His efficient research and his extensive sources are thorough and persuasive.
The text is clear and supported by interesting examples. Moreover, reading is further facilitated
by appropriate headings and excellent summaries in each chapter. Overall, Decisions and Images:
The Supreme Court and the Press is timely and insightful. Richard Davis certainly raises issues
which should be discussed and debated along
with other Supreme Court debates.

attempts to use its power to control the information flow to its own advantage" (130). Once again
the paradox of the text is evident: Davis argues
that "[t]he justices seek to convey the impression
that they are disinterested in news coverage
about them and that they would be satisfied if
the press would just go away" (131). He suggests
that this practice (of consciously "active" disinterest) forces the reporters to turn to the news
that the justices want them to turn to, namely, the
written decisions. This certainly could be true.
Or, it could also be true that the justices simply
"enjoy their relative obscurity as individuals, "
which Davis suggests a few pages later (152). As
reporter Tony Mauro explains, "They [the justices] much covet their privacy and their anonymity ... They're very loath to lose that" (152).
Whether the justices are purposely perpetuating

Kylie Nielson Turley
Graduate Student, American Studies

Politics and the Media. Edited by Richard Davis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 417p.
In Politics and the Media, Davis has compiled articles, opinion pieces and empirical studies representing each species of political media
players. He juxtaposes studies by media and
communication scholars with opinion papers and
anecdotal accounts by journalists, politicians,
public officials, and interest group agents. This
presentational style allows Davis to structure the
information in an orderly discussion of the history, present reality, and potential future of the
media's role in American politics; but at the same
time Davis avoids telling us what the political
players think in favor of allowing them to tell
their stories themselves. This book gathers the
otherwise scattered thoughts and experiences of
many experts in narrow aspects of the political
media into a format that tells a more comprehensive, understandable story of the mass media's
political influences.
Davis structures the book in an instructional format, with a brief discussion of a wide
spectrum of political media topics. Each section is
supplemented with suggested readings on the
subject discussed. The book would be excellent as
a text for courses focusing on the media's influence on government.
The book is not limited to a discussion of
campaigns and the media, although that topic is
addressed. It begins with a brief discussion of

media's historical development as a player in
American politics and moves into a inclusive discussion of the modern media's relationship with
each branch of government and all of the major
players in American politics. Political and media
institutions, individuals, and interest groups are
considered in turn. The effect of media coverage
on voters, candidates, policy makers, bureaucrats, and Supreme Court justices is discussed.
The alleged biases of the media and the effect
those biases have on coverage and content of the
news is also addressed, along with the interaction
of individual media and political personalities.
Davis carefully observes the symbiotic
interaction between the media and political figures and institutions. Davis' introductory analysis of many of the articles he selected mentions
the constantly changing relationship as the media
needs sources of hard news and as political officeholders or officeseekers need media coverage.
Davis presents an excellent consideration of how
presidents are, in turn, controlled and controlling
of the news media, with an examination of how
policy demands made on presidents accelerate as
the results of their action or inaction are played
out on the public's television screen.
Davis' strength is his continuous inquiry
into the role of mass media in modern politics,
addressed through a series of thoughtful ques-
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tions. Even more effective are their partial answers, allowing the readers to draw their own
conclusions. How do journalists see their role?
How do we as voters and media consumers see
their role? Is the media to interpret the complex
events of the day and give us a synopsis? Davis
points out that scarcity of time and interest requires that media representatives do so, and in so
doing the news selection process "guarantees that
the news will reflect particular individual or
group perspectives on reality" (34).
Would we rather the media be "neutral
carriers" of the news, or do we want the press to
challenge officeholders in order to elicit otherwise withheld information (93)? It seems that

media consumers respond to both. We want the
media to perform a multitude of functions, from
watchdog to informer to entertainer.
Davis presents his inquiry into the politics and media inter-relationship in a style that is
both informative and entertaining. The pieces he
selects address current media issues and point to
future concerns. For students of politics or communications, Politics and the Media is a great way
to better understand the love-hate relationship
between politics and the news.

Jay T. Jorgensen
BYU Law Student

America the Vincible: U.S. Foreign Policy for Twenty-first Century. By Earl H. Fry,
Stan A. Taylor, and Robert S. Wood. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994.
356p.
Fry, Taylor, and Wood take a refreshing
look at America's role in the next century. They
are not doomsayers, arguing (like Paul Kennedy)
that America is a great power quickly falling to
has-been status. Nor are they naive, blind to the
significant challenges facing the United States in
a world full of rising rivals in the military, economic, and technological spheres. Their title has
been chosen carefully to reflect their thesis.
America is "vincible," not invincible nor vanquished. The authors, in considering America as
vincible, answer their own call for "a sober assessment of the conditions and responsibilities of
a great power" (6).
The book is split into three parts. First is
a discussion of how U.S. foreign policy is made.
The analysis runs the gamut from constitutional
matters to American society and culture. In particular, there is a thorough explanation of the role
played by the National Security Council in foreign policy formulation. The authors advocate
having the Secretary of State assume the responsibilities now held by the constitutionally unaccountable National Security Advisor. Vital energy is sapped by internecine bureaucratic battles
within the executive branch. "Presidents need to
focus on resolving conflicts between America and
other nations, not on resolving conflicts between
competing sections of their administrations" (67).
Second, America the Vincible moves on to
U.s. defense policy. Fry, Taylor, and Wood have

taken pains to examine America's role in a postCold War world, by detailing the history of U.s.
defense policy and then considering the strategic
considerations ahead in the next few years. Specifically, the chapter on terrorism reinforces their
thesis that in an increasingly interdependent
world, Americans (both at home and abroad) are
vulnerable to terrorist attack. They assert that "an
appropriate perspective may be the single most
important weapon to use against terrorists" (256).
The perspective offered is that, while there are
some specific steps to be taken to combat terrorism (which they detail), there are nonetheless
more serious threats to American interests.
The third section of the book deals with
economic policy, which "may have now moved
up to the top tier on the U.S. foreign policy
agenda" (241). Not only is the reader offered a
concise explanation of how America fares in the
web of nations which constitute the world economy, but also a sober look at the environmental
challenges facing the nation. The result is an argument for both further economic engagement
internationally, and "decisive" government action
to prevent further degradation of the environment.
This is not a textbook. It is a book by foreign policy experts for foreign policy experts. But
those who would enjoy the book are by no means
restricted to the experts--whether undergraduate
political science students or just interested lay-
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merely for stimulating reading, America the Vincible stands as a book worth adding to one's library.

men. The data and sources used are impressive,
even if the frequency of their use is inconsistent.
Some chapters have nearly one hundred endnotes, others fewer than ten. Throughout, however, the book is written with a clarity and style
which set it apart from much academic work.
Whether as a source for research papers or

David Campbell
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In the Lions' Den: The Story of Senator Orrin Hatch. By Richard Vetterli and Brad E.
Hainsworth. Springville, Utah: Cedar Fort Incorporated, 1994. 340p.
book. Vetterli and Hainsworth describe Hatch's
emergence as an unknown Salt Lake lawyer who
makes a stunning victory in the primary after a
late campaign start and then caps it off by defeating incumbent Democrat Frank Moss. Hatch
was aided by then BYU President Ernest Wilkinson and bolstered by an unusual pre-primary endorsement from Ronald Reagan, already very
popular in Utah at the time. Less detail is offered
about subsequent elections, probably because
they lack the same excitement as 1976.
Vetterli and Hainsworth cover many
Senate battles over such topics as labor law reform, the balanced budget (1995 was not the first
time), the Equal Rights Amendment, and confirmation hearings for Robert Bork and Clarence
Thomas. In each case, the perspective is very favorable toward Hatch. If the new Senate minority
is looking for a model for a successful filibuster,
they should examine Hatch and company's successful filibuster of labor reform legislation in
1978. "[T]he filibuster lasted five, gut-wrenching
weeks. And when it was over it had withstood a
total of six cloture votes, one of them by a single
vote" (117).
Overall, the book is an intriguing account
of the political experiences of Orrin Hatch as seen
through the eyes of two favorable observers. If
you like Orrin Hatch, you'll like the book.

Having two favorable books published
about you in the midst of a reelection campaign
would boost anyone's hopes for victory. Besides
Vetterli and Hainsworth's book, journalist Lee
Roderick also published a biography about Orrin
Hatch (Leading the Charge: Orrin Hatch and 20
Years of America, Gold Leaf Press, 1994). Both are
overwhelmingly favorable toward the Senator.
Vetterli and Hainsworth did not write a
political science book in the traditional sense. Instead, it's a political biography written in a style
that's easy to read. The theme centers on the political battles fought by Orrin Hatch, both for
election to the Senate and within the Senate.
Vetterli and Hainsworth use the images of the
mace and the olive branch throughout as they
describe scenes where Senator Hatch battles Senate liberals one day and makes peace the next
(104).
Vetterli and Hainsworth have carried
over several chapters from an earlier book by
Vetterli, Orrin Hatch: Challenging the Washington
Establishment (1982, Regenery Gateway).
Throughout the book the documentation is
sometimes confusing: usually it is given as part
of the text, but in the end chapters, it is placed in
endnotes. At times I wished for more detail in
their sources. For example, they quote James Q.
Wilson about the liberal bias of the news media
without documentation (108).
The book begins with Hatch's election in
1976, perhaps the most entertaining part of the
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War and the Rise of the State. By Bruce Porter. New York: Free Press, 1994. 364p.
War and the Rise of the State provides an
interesting and insightful description of the interaction between war and the modern state. It

traces the rise of the modern state, linking each
increase in centralized power to war or the threat
of war. Almost without exception, books that in37
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and between both World Wars, the British government radically increased social welfare
spending. When women went to work in factories, the government felt obliged to provide government-sponsored child care and to create
stricter work place safety laws. The government
also implemented extensive programs for both
veterans and the general public, arguing that a
generation who had suffered so much deserved
to be repaid for its sacrifices. Porter observes
similar patterns in the United states. This observation has disturbing implications for both contemporary conservatives and liberals. Few liberals will be pleased to learn that most of the significant welfare and social reforms of this century
arose not out of Roosevelt's New Deal or Johnson's Great Society programs, but directly out of
U.s. involvement in both World Wars, Korea,
and Vietnam. Conversely, conservatives might be
disturbed to discover that military spending has
histOrically opened the floodgates for domestic
spending as well. Porter records that all but five
cabinet departments and the majority of smaller
federal agencies came into being during warrelated eras (292).
Professor Porter's writing style is clear
and concise. Readers may occasionally encounter
a little known historical reference, for example,
the Kronstadt Revolt (224). Porter does not explain such references. The presentation, however,
is clear enough that readers can easily grasp the
basic concepts without understanding every reference. Porter often spices up his conclusions
with literary references or language that borders
on poetic: "The killing fields of the twentieth
century bear witness to the pernicious possibilities of the modern state and the brutality latent in
human hearts" (241).
On the whole War and the Rise of the State
in an interesting and informative work, carefully
researched, clearly written, and highly recommended to anyone interested in the study of war,
the modern state, or how states gain centralized
power.

vestigate the relationship between war and the
state focus on how the structure of the state affects war. Porter takes a different approach: he
examines how war affects the state, specifically,
how war has facilitated the rise of the modern
state.
Porter divides the effects of war on the
state into three categories: (1) organizing or formative effects, (2) disintegrative effects, and (3)
reformative effects. Currently civil wars in Bosnia, Chechnya, and ethnic or religious conflicts in
many third world countries amply demonstrate
the disintegrative effects of war on the state. War
and the Rise of the State, however, provides examples of the formative and reformative effects of
war. Germany and Italy, for example, became
unified states through warfare. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismark deliberately led Prussia
into three wars to unify Germany. Those examples should be well known to both students and
historians. Few, however, have recognized war
as the source of reform movements. For example,
women gained the right to vote in many countries as a direct result of their involvement in
World War I (178). Eisenhower even justified his
proposal for an interstate highway system as an
essential element in improving America's defense
capabilities (293).
Porter's book is replete with additional
examples which illustrate a fascinating paradox
of war: on the one hand, war is the most destructive of all human activities, and yet, on the other
hand, it is the most organized. Wartime mobilization provides examples of the greatest cooperation of human effort. Modern wars in particular require the complete mobilization of society in support of the war effort. This type of unified effort can only be organized from the top
down. Central governments manipulate patriotism and nationalism to garner support for military activity. In such circumstances, power inevitably accrues to the central government. Typically, states emerge after a war with much
greater centralized power than before. Furthermore, what Porter describes as the "ratchet effect" ensures that the state will remain stronger.
Governments invariably increase taxes and create
new agencies to support the war effort. After the
war, however, governments rarely rush to lower
taxes or to dismantle new agencies. While some
demobilization occurs, the government remains
more powerful and more centralized.
Porter notes that wars often provide a
potent stimulus for social welfare reform. During
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Pi Sigma Alpha (PSA) is the national political science honor society. BYU's
chapter is called Beta Mu. At BYU, PSA's traditional activities include
monthly socials in faculty homes, guest speakers, Oktoberfest, a monthly
newsletter, an annual closing banquet, an annual writing contest which culminates in this journal, and other activities unique to each year. PSA provides
students with many opportunities to get involved and get better acquainted
with their fellow students and professors outside the classroom setting.
The Beta Mu chapter is one of PSA's largest and most active. If you are interested in becoming an associate member of PSA, you can pick up an application in 745 SWKT. PSA is active during Fall and Winter semesters.

